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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
FRED L. EATON. 
Defendant-Appellant• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with unlawful distribution 
for value of a controlled susbtance, to-wit: heroin, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (a) (i) (1953), as 
amended« 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty on March 18, 1976, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding. On April 
4, 1976, the trial court sentenced appellant to an indeter-
minate term not to exceed fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Case No. 
14543 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the jury and the sentence imposed by the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his brief appellant recites "facts" which were 
not in evidence at his trial, giving his version of what 
occurred for the first time on appeal rather than at the 
trial court level in his defense. The faces revealed by 
the record are as follows: 
On December 9, 1975, an undercover narcotics1 
agent for the Ogden City Police, Ken Goode, made a "con-
trolled buy" of heroin at the residence located at 823 
West Ellis Street, Ogden, Utah (Tr.36-49,105,123,128-136). 
Ken Goode testifed that at approximately 1:00 p.m. on 
December 9, 1975, he set up a herein purchase for about 
3:00 p.m. later that same day at the West Ellis residence 
(Tr.128,129), and that he contacted Ogden police officers, 
Mosher, Searle and Burnett about this proposed buy (Tr.128). 
Robert Searle, Ogden City police officer in the narcotics* 
division, testified that on December 9, 1975, he and some 
other police officers met with Ker Goode at the Copper 
-2~ 
Cottage at approximately 3:00 p.m. to discuss this pro-
posed buy (Tr.40,41). At this meeting, Searle stated 
he gave Goode $200 to make the buy and conducted a body 
search of him to determine that he had no money of his 
own or any narcotic drugs on him (Tr.41). Searle 
testified that Goode's wife, Charlene, was present with 
him at the Copper Cottage and that she too was searched 
(Tr.40,41). Searle also testified that Goode's car was 
searched by Detective Burnett (Tr.42,73). Officer Searle 
indicated that from the time Ken Goode left the Cooper 
Cottage to the time he returned to the Copper Cottage 
after the sale was completed, Goode was under police 
surveillance with the exception of the few minutes 
Goode spent at 823 West Ellis Street (Tr.42-45). The 
officer estimated that the total time Goode spent inside 
the residence was approximately five minutes (Tr.44). 
When Goode returned to the Copper Cottage after making 
the buy, Searle testified he turned over eight balloons 
of suspected heroin to the police (Tr.44,45,81). Searle 
and the other police officers involved in this heroin buy 
testified that they observed nothing at all unusual about 
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Ken Goode's behavior or speech patterns that afternoon 
either before or after the heroin buy (Tr.43f44,104,113F116, 
240) . 
Gerald Burnett, an Ogden City police officer, 
corroborated Officer Searle*s testimony, testifying 
that he searched Ken Goode's automobile (Tr.l02f109-112), 
finding no drugs (Tr.103), and that he observed Goode go 
to the residence at 823 West Ellis Street and enter it 
alone at about 3:46 p.m. and exit it at approximately 
3:50 p.m. (Tr.103). Burnett testified that Detective 
Taylor searched Goode1s vehicle when he returned to the 
Copper Cottage (Tr.l04)« 
Both Searle and Burnett testified that they 
knew Ken Goode was a heroin addict (Tr.36f107,118)f but 
that at the time of this incident they knew he was on a 
methadone program (Tr.36,114). Officer Searle testified 
that it was necessary to use a heroin addict in this case 
because it might have been necessary for the "buyer" to 
shoot some of the heroin himself: 
WQ. Is there any danger of 
problems with using police officers? 
A. Yes, there would be no way 
that they would be able to go in, 
because they wouldn't allow them in to 
begin with, because they don't know 
them, and generally they make them 
shoot heroin inside the residence and 
in that case they wouldn't be able to use 
a police officer because he wouldn't be 
able to inject a narcotic. 
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Q. Do you know, in your 
experience as an officer working 
in narcotics, if heroin pushers 
will usually sell just to anyone? 
A. No, they will not." 
(Tr.38). 
The State's main witness was Ken Goode, an 
undercover narcotics1 agent with the Ogden City Police 
Department (Tr.l23)c He testified that he had been a 
heroin addict and that on December 9, 1975, he was on 
a methadone program (Tr*124). He admitted that he had 
been convicted of drug related felonies previously and 
that he had one pending as of the date of the trial 
(Tr.125,126)* When asked why he became a narcotics1 
agent, he replied: 
lfA. Well, I was just tired 
of my life, tired of the drugs out 
there and everything that I had been 
involved around, and like I said 
before, heroin does a lot of harm, 
and I wanted to get myself out of 
that kind of life that I was living, 
and if I could help other people 
by doing what I did, then that is 
good too." (Tr.l24)„ 
Goode also testified that although he had 
a charge pending and that he was hopeful his services 
to the police department might have some bearing on the 
charge, no promises were ever made to him to reduce 
the charge in exchange for his services (Tr.126, 164): 
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"A. There was no promise 
made, I did not ask for any 
promise. I went into it to do what 
I felt I had to do, to help myself 
and like I said before, if I can 
help anyone else, and I can be hope-
ful that I will get some consideration, 
but I have not been promised any* I 
was not promised prior to it, during 
it, or at any time." (Tr*164). 
Ken Goodefs testimony inculpating the appellant 
was that after he met with the police officers at the 
Copper Cottage and was searched and was given $200•00 
(Tr.129,130), he drove to 823 West Ellis Street followed 
by one of the detectives (Tr.132). He testified that 
when he entered the house he saw one Albert Ross with 
whom he had spoken earlier about the proposed buy (Tr. 
132,134). He stated that the appellant came into the 
room "a few minutes after I entered." (Trd32). Goode 
testified that he made small talk for a few minutes, 
hoping that Albert Ross would bring up "the business at 
hand." (Tr.132,133). According to Goode's testimony, 
Ross then asked him if he was " there for the eight,1 
referring to the eight balloons of heroin." Goode 
testified that he replied he had, to which Ross 
responded by pointing to the appellant who pulled the 
heroin from his pocket and laid it on a table (Tr.133). 
Goode stated that he took the $200.00 out and tried to 
give it to Ross who told him to give it to the appellant. 
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Goode testified he did so and picked up the heroin* 
Goode testified that he did not say 
anything after this exchange, claiming that Ross said 
a few things to him after which he left promptly (Tr, 
135)• He then stated that he drove to the Copper 
Cottage and turned over all eight balloons of heroin 
to Officer Searle (Tr*137)« Although the record is a 
little confusing as to when he identified the appellant, 
Goode testified that it was December 9th that he identified 
the appellant as one of the two individuals who made the 
sale of the heroin and that on December 22ndf he made a 
further identification from mug shots (Tr.l38f139). 
The appellant's defense consisted of witness 
testimony designed to impeach Ken Goode by showing his 
true motive for making these alleged "buys" as an under-
cover agent was to get out from under his own felony charge 
then pending against him (Tr.192-332)• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF AN ADMITTED DRUG ADDICT 
IS RELIABLE IS A QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF FACT. 
Appellant seems to argue that the undercover 
agent*s testimony is inherently defective and unreliable 
because he was addicted to drugs and was therefore 
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afflicted with a form of insanity called "toxicomania9n 
Appellant apparently further argues that this is an 
illness that renders Ken Goode incompetent as a witness 
against him. In support of this theory, appellant relies 
on Robinson v« California, 370 U«>S. 660 (1962). In 
Robinson, the United States Supreme Court struck down 
a California statute which made the"fstatus1 of narcotic 
addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may 
be prosecuted fat any time before he reforms.1" Id., at 
666* The Court in Robinson recognized drug addiction as 
an illness for which imprisonment would be cruel and unusual 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Respondent contends that Robinson does not apply 
in the instant case. The United States Supreme Court 
did not hold that drug addiction is an illness equivalent 
to insanity, thereby rendering all addicts incompetent* 
The Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute 
that made an individual's status a criminal offense, 
rather than his conduct. In the case at bar, several 
witnesses testified that Ken Goode was behaving in a 
normal, usual manner on December 9, 1975. Further, the 
State introduced David George, the director of the center 
for human toxicology for the University of Utah, and a 
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member of the faculty of the College of Medicine and the 
College of Pharmacy at the University of Utah, to testify 
as to the effect of heroin and methadone. He testified 
that the first effect of heroin is a "euphoric, good 
feeling or high" (Tr.90), but that when absorbed over 
a long period of time a tolerance develops against the 
drug so that the taking of it only prevents withdrawal 
symptoms (Tr.91). 
Dre George testified as to the effects of 
methadone because Ken Goode was on the methadone program 
and had taken his methadone the mornijng of December 9, 
1975. Dr. George testified that methadone works on an 
individual in the same way as does heroin except that 
"a person who takes methadone regularly would also 
build up this tolerance to the euphoric effect or good 
feeling or high and so forth.11 (Tr„9l,92)* 
"Also any other side effects like 
nausea or vomiting and so forth with a 
few minor exceptions, like a person very 
seldom ever builds up a tolerance to 
constipation. They are constantly 
constipated and they constantly sweat. 
Other than that, after they take the 
drug for a considerable amount of time, 
a few months, they have no good effects 
and since it is exactly qualitative 
like heroin, they are interchangeable. 
That means one is tolerant to heroin 
they are also tolerant to methadone and 
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one who is tolerant to methadone 
is also tolerant to heroin. That 
means if you take methadone 
regularly every morning and if you 
then go ahead a take a shot of 
heroin it will have no effect 
whatsoever«" (Tr.92). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Dr. George testified that a person on the 
methadone program as was Ken Goode on December 9, 1975, 
can function normally and that there are no restrictions 
on his activities (Tr.93)* When asked specifically what 
would happen to a person on methadone if he were given a 
shot of heroin, Dr. George replied: 
"A* With the only restriction, 
I assume that we are talking about 
being realistic as heroin is shot, 
that you buy on the street and so 
forth. Nothing.w (Tr.9 3,9 4). 
Further, Dr. George testified that someone on the 
methadone program would not be hindered in his perception 
or ability to recall events while on that program (Tr.94). 
Webster's New International Unabridged Dictionary, 
Second Edition, defines toxicomania as an "addiction to a 
drug, or opium or cocaine." Without going into the medical 
complexities, nowhere in the record or in Webster's is 
toxicomania defined as a "form of insanity" as appellant 
suggests. Neither has the United States Supreme Court 
decided that drug addiction is a form of insanity. 
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The record is replete with evidence that a person 
with a heroin addiction on the methadone program as was 
Ken Goode at the time of this offense can and does function 
normally even if he ingests heroin into his system. The 
record is also replete with evidence that on December 9, 
1975, Ken Goode was observed as acting and speaking normally. 
Whether the jury believes this evidence and the evidence 
supplied by Ken Goode is a matter within their discretion. 
In State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977)f the appellant 
argued that the testimony of an undercover agent who 
purchased a balloon of heroin in a controlled buy wa£ 
inherently unreliable because she was a former heroin 
user and had a motive to fabricate the story and that 
since the agent's testimony was indispensible to the 
conviction, there must necessarily have been a reasonable 
doubt as to guilt* This Court struck down that reasoning, 
stating: 
"The judging of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence is exclusively the prerogative 
of the jury. Consequently, we are 
obliged to assume that the jury believed 
those aspects of the evidence, and drew 
those inferences that reasonably could 
be drawn therefrom, in the light favorable 
to the verdict.11 
In the instant case, the appellant has failed to 
rebut the presumption that the trier of fact could reasonably 
rely on the testimony of the undercover agent and therefore, 
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the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant argues on appeal that there was 
insufficient evidence of his guilt to justify a convic-
tion in this case, and that without evidence of guilt, a 
conviction violates due process. He cites Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), for the proposition that 
a conviction totally without evidentiary support is 
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Garner, id.f the petitioners 
had been convicted of "disturbing the peace" by conducting 
themselves in such a manner as "would foreseeably disturb 
or alarm the public," id. at 165. The undisputed evidence 
was that these Negro petitioners entered some Louisiana 
places of eating and quietly took seats where only white 
people were customarily served: 
"The petitioners not only made 
no speeches, they did not even 
speak to anyone except to order food; 
they carried no placards, and did 
nothing beyond their mere presence at 
the lunch counter, to attract attention 
to themselves or to others. In none of 
these cases was there any testimony 
that the petitioners were told that 
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their mere presence wa$ causing, or 
was likely to causet a disturbance of 
the peace, nor that the petitioners 
were ever asked to leave the counters 
or the establishments by anyone connected 
with the stores." Id., at 170. 
In Garnerf id.f there was absolutely no evidence 
to satisfy the elements of the offenste with which the 
petitionerswere charged % 
88The undisputed evidence shows 
that the police who arrested the 
petitioners were left with nothing 
to support their actions except their 
own opinions that it was a breach of 
the peace for the petitioners to sit 
peacefully in a place where custom 
decreed they should n0t sit. Such 
activity, in the circumstances of 
these cases, is not evidence of any 
crime and cannot be sq consideredf 
either by the police 6x by the courts.11 
Id. at 174. 
Unlike Garnerf in the instant casef tihere existed evidence 
of the appellant's guilt. Ken Goode testified that it 
was the appellant who took the eight balloons of heroin from 
his pocket and laid it on the table 4nd that it was the 
appellant who took the $200.00 as payment for that heroin. 
Goode further testified that he identified the appellant 
on December 9th and that he identified him also from mug 
shots on December 22nd. 
There is no question that the State has the burden 
of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal 
prosecution. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); 
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State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 1975); State v. 
Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P.2d 269 (1972); State v. 
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); State v, 
Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State v. 
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State v. 
Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955). The Utah 
Supreme Court succinctly stated the requirements for 
the sufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict 
in State v. Allgood, supra. The evidence is insufficient 
if it is "so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reason-
able minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime," 
28 Utah 2d at 120, 449 P.2d at 270. Also, in State v. 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that a guilty verdict may be set 
aside when "taking the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the verdict, "the "findings are unreasonable." 
Id.*, 11 Utah 2d at 214, 357 P.2d at 186-..' 
Whether evidence is sufficient or not to support 
a guilty verdict is a factual question for the trier of 
fact. The jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve 
witnesses. In the very recent case of State v. Wilson, 
supra, this Court held: 
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"The judging of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence is exclusively the 
prerogative of the jury. Consequently, 
we are obliged to assume that the jury 
believed those aspects of the evidence, 
and drew those inferences that reason-
ably could be drawn therefrom, in the 
light favorable to thQ verdict." 
Id. at 68. 
In the case at barf the only witness who claims to have 
seen the appellant inside the house and thus the only 
one who can implicate him in this crime is Ken Goode, 
the undercover agente Goode is the person who made the 
heroin buy and the one who identified the appellant as 
one of the two individuals involved. The appellant's 
defense was to impeach the credibility of Ken Goode. 
It is clear from the verdict that in the battle of 
who to believe, the jury chose to believe Ken Goode. 
It would be a reasonable inference for the jury to draw 
that Ken Goode was telling the truth when he said that 
his motive for becoming an undercover agent was that he 
was "tired of [his] life, tired of the drugs out there 
and everything. . .and if [he] could help some other 
people by doing what [he] did, then that is good too." 
(Tr.124). It would be a reasonable inference that Ken 
Goode was telling the truth when he said that he had 
no animosity towards the appellant (Tr.127,128) or that 
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he had to fulfill some kind of quota to receive favorable 
consideration on his pending felony charge (Tr.126,128). 
It is a reasonable inference that Ken Goode was 
telling the truth when he testified that the appellant 
participated in selling him eight balloons of heroin and 
received $200.00 for doing so. 
Admittedly, there is some confusion in the 
record as to when Ken Goode identified the appellant. 
Officer Searle stated that Goode identified Ross as the 
man with whom he made the arrangements for the buy. 
Searle testified that he did not recall whether Goode 
knew the appellant prior to the buy or not, but that in 
any event Goode identified the appellant when he was 
shown mug shots. Searle also testified that showing 
the undercover agent mug shots for identification was 
standard procedure, and that Goode probably was shown 
the photographs on December 9 (Tr.75,76). Ken Goode 
testified that when he made his statement of the 
incident he used the appellant's name (Tr.138). Goode 
also stated he picked the appellant's photograph out 
of the mug shots on December 9 and on December 22 (Tr. 
138,139). Goode explained that the later identification 
was for the purpose of identifying another person (Tr. 
139). 
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In any event, the question raised by the 
appellant does not relate to a faulty identification 
but rather when it was made* Ken Goodefs testimony of 
his identification of the appellant was sufficiently 
corroborated by Officer Searle, thereby giving it more 
credibility. The jury was entitled to believe the 
accuracy of the identification. 
POINT III 
^HE PROSECUTOR MADE NO REMARKS REGARDING 
THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT TESTIFY THAT 
COULD HAVE PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT. 
in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), 
the United States Supreme Court held that California's 
practice of commenting on the fact that a defendant 
did not take the stand in his own defense was uncon-
stitutional as it put a penalty on the exercise of a 
person's right not to be compelled to be a witness 
against hiriiseif , guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to 
the United states Constitution* In (phapman v. California, 
386 U.S. IS (1967), the United State$ Supreme Court 
expanded on this, holding that even though it is error 
for a prosecutor to comment on the absence of the 
defendant's; testimony, it may be a harmless constitutional 
error; to be so, however, the State must demonstrate 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's comments 
(and in Chapman, the trial judge's instructions)/ did 
not contribute to the defendant's conviction. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue 
specifically in State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah, 1975), 
in which the defendant sought a reveral of his conviction 
on the sole ground that the prosecutor prejudicially 
commented in his closing argument concerning the defendant's 
failure to testify at trial. The defendant complained that 
the prosecutor's comments "The defense has presented no 
evidence as to why the defendant was out there [at the 
construction cite where building materials were stolen]• 
What was he doing out there?"—were prejudicial to him* 
In formulating a standard, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the variant interests involved in this issue: 
"It is not to be doubted that the 
right of a defendant not to testify in 
a criminal trial is a fundamental right 
protected by both the federal and the 
Utah Constitutions* Its exercise should 
in no way prejudice him in the eyes of 
the court or jury. He need give no 
reason; and there should be no concern 
as to his reason for not testifying. 
The simple and immutable fact is, that 
for what we accept as good and sufficient 
reasons, the privilege has been long 
established that comments concerning 
an accused's failure to testify, however, 
adroitly disguised, may have the effect 
of impairing or destroying the privilege? 
and that this should not be done. 
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The other side of this proposition 
is: that the prosecutor, and the public, 
whose interest he representsr should and 
does have a right to argue the case upon 
the basis of the total picture shown by 
the evidence or the lack thereof. If 
either counsel cannot voice a challenge 
to the effect of the total evidence, then 
one is made to wonder, what may he talk 
about? It is our opinion that it is not 
only the prerogative, but the duty of 
either counsel, to analyze all aspects of 
the evidence; and this should include any 
pertinent statements or deductions reason-
ably to be drawn therefrom as to what the 
evidence is or is not, and what it does 
or does not show. The prosecutor's 
comment under scrutiny here falls within 
the principle just stated; and he made 
no direct reference to the fact that the 
defendant had not taken the stand. 
This problem has arisen in sister 
states who have ruled that statements of 
the nature here involved are legitimate 
comments on what the total evidence does 
or does not show, and are not violative 
of the constitutional right defendant 
asserts." Id. at 951. 
In the case at bar, the appellant cites prosecutorial 
statements out of context. The comments complained of are 
located at Tr.343, 344: 
"That is basically the State's case. 
We believe that the evidence is proven 
here beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
defendant was the one that sold the 
material to the undercover agent. 
What about the defendant's case? 
What does the defendant tell us? The 
defendant's entire attack, of course, 
is on the credibility of Mr. Goode and 
probably rightly so because he is the 
only one, he and the defendant, that 
really know what took place in that 
house. 
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What did defense counsel tell you 
when he started? He said that Mr. Goode 
was lying, that Mr, Goode wasn't telling 
us the truth about what actually happened 
on that day. He said in his opening 
remarks that we're going to prove to 
you that Mr. Goode was out to get all the 
blacks in the community, that Mr. Goode1s 
wife was a prostitute and that her pimp, 
as he called it, was a black. Well you 
know ladies and gentlemen, I listened 
to the entire defense in this case and I 
never heard one shred of evidence from the 
defendant to prove any motive, any reason, 
that showed that Ken Goode was out to get 
blacks in the community. No evidence at all 
has been presented to you members of this 
jury that really proved that particular 
contention. 
What else did he tell you? He told 
you that the only reason that Ken Goode 
made these cases, the only reason that 
he made this particulcir case against this 
defendant was because he had some charges 
hanging over his head and he thought if he 
trumped-up or made up enough stories that 
the people in the community, that they would 
certainly go easy on him. Is there any 
evidence to support that contention that 
the defendant makes." 
The comments of this prosecutor clearly fall 
within "the duty. . .to analyze all aspects of the 
evidence. . •(including). . .any pertinent statements or 
deductions reasonably to be drawn therefrom as to what 
the evidence is or is not and what it does or does not 
show." Id. at 951. 
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Moreover, even if these comments could be 
considered directed towards the appellant's failure 
to testify, these are not the sort of comments 
that could be considered prejudicial error to hinw 
Something more than mere error is required by both 
Chapman v. United States, supra, and [State v. Kazda, 
supra; 
"There is another consideration 
supportive of our conclusion that 
there was no prejudicial error here* 
Defendant makes no cor^tention or even 
suggestion concerning his innocence* 
His argument falls in the pattern which 
has become so usual in criminal cases in 
recent times; that there was an 
irregularity or error in the proceedings. 
We are under the mandate of our statute, 
and of well established decisional law that 
we should not reverse a conviction for 
mere error or irregularity (neither of 
which exists here) bui^  would do so 
only if there were error which had a 
substantial effect upon the defendantys 
right to a fair trial in that in the 
absence of the error there is reasonable 
likelihood that there Vfould have been a 
different result. " Kaz[da at 951. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Finally, the appellant failed to make any 
objection to these statements, and by failing to do so, 
he waived the objection. In Kazda, the defendant 
objected to the prosecutor's comment^ and moved for a 
mistrial which was denied. The triaj. court admonished 
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the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments and: 
". • .reminded them that 
counsel's statements are not 
evidence* He further directed 
the jury to follow the instructions 
previously given concerning the 
defendant's privilege of not 
testifying; and that they should 
draw no inferences as to his guilt 
therefrom* It is also shown that 
the prosecutor had himself reminded 
the jury of that instruction; and 
that defense counsel re-emphasized 
this principle in his argument." 
Id. at 951. 
This Court concluded its opinion by underscoring the 
rehabilitative effect of these admonishments: 
"If it be assumed that there 
is any possibility that the prosecutor's 
comment complained of was prejudicial 
to the defendant/ this was rectified 
insofar as that possibly could be donef 
even on a retrialf by the timely 
reiteration of the correct principles 
by the court, reinforced by the 
arguments of both counsel." Id., at 
952. 
In the instant case, appellant cannot now complain 
that these comments were prejudicial when he afforded the 
trial court no opportunity to rectify what he now considers 
prejudicial. 
Respondent submits that the comments made by the 
prosecutor were in no way prejudicial to the outcome of 
appellant's trial and that even if they could be considered 
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error, appellant waived his objection by failing to 
timely object* 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT KNOWINGLY RELINQUISHED HIS 
RIGHT TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER BRUESTLE AND 
KENT GLANVILLE BY STIPULATION. 
At noon on the day of his trial, the appellant, 
together with his two attorneysf Maurice Richards and 
John Cainef and the prosecutor appeared before the trial 
judge in his chambers* The purpose of this proceeding 
was for appellant1s counsel, Mr* Richardsf to propose a 
stipulation of the testimony to be offered by Officer Bruestle 
and Kent Glanville« Officer Bruestle was to testify that 
he removed the eight balloons of heroin from the evidence 
lockerf that he placed it in the evidence room and that 
he turned it over to Kent Glanville, the chemist* He 
was to also testify that the heroin was returned to the 
evidence room and that it was released from his care and 
custody at the preliminary hearing and introduced in 
evidence there and finally that it has been in the custody 
and control of the Clerkfs office since that time (Tr.85f 
86). 
Kent Glanville was to testify that he analyzed 
the eight balloons and ascertained that they were in fact 
heroin (Tr.86). 
The record reveals that the trial judge asked 
the appellant if he understood what his counsel wanted 
to do for him, to which the appellant responded that he 
did: 
"THE COURT: Show the presence of 
Mr* Richards, the Defendant, Mr. Jones 
and the Court personnel. [Sic—also 
Mr. Caine.] 
You must understand that this type 
of stipulation cannot be entered into 
without your consent. If you want to 
hear the evidence you have the right to 
hear the evidence. You understand this? 
MR. EATON: Yes, I understand that. 
THE COURT: What Mr. Richards 
wants to do is probably a matter of 
trial strategy. Maybe he doesnft want 
to lose to the jury or something else. 
Otherwise you can talk to him about his 
personal reasons for wanting to do it or 
not do it. You understand that he cannot 
do it without your consent. 
MR. EATON: Yes, sir; Your Honor.11 
(Tr.85). 
The trial judge then requested what was the nature of the 
proposed stipulation. For the next few moments the 
prosecutor and the appellant's lawyers discussed this 
agreement in the appellant's presence. Thusf contrary 
to what the appellant now contends, the record is not 
silent as to him being informed of his right to hear 
these witness's testimonies. Appellant heard the trial 
court inform him of his right to hear the evidence, and 
indicated that he understood this. Moreover, the fact 
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that it was his own attorneys1 proposal and that he does 
not challenge their competence to represent him, he should 
not now be permitted to retract his statement on the 
record that he made an understanding waiver, 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant 
has failed to show that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to justify a conviction, that he was in 
any way prejudiced by the prosecutorfs comments in 
summation, or that he did not make an understanding waiver 
of his right to hear two witnesses when his own lawyers 
arranged a stipulation of their testimony• Respondent 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the verdict 
and judgment of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT Be HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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